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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-




BRIEF OF RESPONDBWl' 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS~Cf 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAD COURTY 1 STAft 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BRYANT B. CRDF'l', 
JUDGE, PRESIDING 
LARRY R. KELLER 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
343 South Sixth East F ~LED Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ordered to show cause as to why probation should not 
be revoked. Appellant moved to dismiss the Order to 
Show Cause on the grounds that the court lost jurisdiction 
over appellant after six months, 1·1hich is the m<n:inum 
sentence for possession. The Court denied the ~:otion. 
RELIEF SOGGHT ON lU'PEl\L 
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the 
decision of the lower court. 
]'i'LSCI' I f;J:I. 
_fol: 
STATEllENT OF FI,CTS 
(See Disposition in the Lower Court) 
ARC;UHENT 
POilJT I 
THE: ~: ~: lc C'Jl " T.CTED CC::LL l?ITHTtJ ST,'.'l'l'~'Ol'J LY 
,\' 1nt contencls thvt thc·rc j c; no st~l.uu,r\· .:ut' ~·-
scribed by the legislature for imprisonr.1cnt for .::1 l i 
Respondent replies th:;t the UtaL Coc1"' :;pee if j Ccl '. '·,· [. 1-u·: ~ 
for extentions of prol:J:~tion beyond Da):j_:c•.un irnpri:;rq:·· :.t 
linits. Furtherr:10re, the Utilh stet~utcc i:~ v<·ry :-; :: .j 1 r ~c· 
most other state and fedcrc•l statut(·:: in tlli:: r• .,,, ·t. 
The Utah la1·1 also p.:,ra llccls stancletrd:: ·;uqr1. ; l , .. J l 
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1\mcrican B.1r Association and the Model Penal Code. 
finally, respondent sutmits that several very important 
policy co~sidcrations are satisfied by the Utah statute. 
Therefore, respondent asks this Court to affirm the 
decision of the district court. 
Contrary to appellant's assertion that there 
is no authcril; for extending a probation period beyond 
a c1o.x imur,\ prison scntc;nce, the Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 77-35-17 (1953) reads: 
"Upo:. a plea of guilty or con-
viction of any crime or offense, if 
1t appe3rs corpatible with the 
~~ulic interest, the court having 
Jurisdiction ray suspend the imposition 
c.r lhe execution of sentence and may 
;.Lace tr.e dcfer:dant on probation for 
~uch period of time as the court Shall 
ClCterinir.e. 
The court m.1y subsequently increase 
or decrease the probation period, and 
may revo::c or modify any condition 
(_l :.... ~ : ,-, ..... 
~on Colle, § ')8-37-8 (10), which 
,Lties 3sessing marijuana, among other 
e Jurt may place a defendant on 
~rot.,'-' t ion U[oC :1 "any rc or · le terms and conditions as may 
! ,!_ rc'quir L:cl." Obviously, the legislature intended to give 
Li1c courts a <JreJt cle2l of uiscretion in granting probation. 
-3-
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important flexibility in the administration of this 
humane perogative. The court may set the duration of 
probation and also modify any conditions thereof. This 
is consistant with the overall policy of the Utah 
Criminal Code as expressed in Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-l-104 (as amended 1975): 
"The provisions of this code 
shall be construed in accordance 
with these general principles: 
(3) prescribe penalties. . which 
permit recognition of difference in 
rehabilitation possibilities among 
indlvidual offenders." (Emphasis 
added) 
As will be der.1onstrated, infra p. 7 , there are ~c:ny 
important re2sons for a court to have broad discretion 
when dealing \'i':", so r;c.~1y different people. NurnProus 
other states rr:~·. ~~is need, as their code pro-
visions demons~rate. 
probation for whatevEr period as they deem hest (C.R.S. 
§ 16-ll-202). Other _;,_at,·:o allov1 the trial court to se>t 
probation Hithin some out. i.de limit that ho.s nothi.nq to 
do with the possible incarceration limits. In Ncvado., 
for example, probation may be extended for as long as 
five years (NRS 176.215). Hawaii, like Nevada places 
no less than a five year limit on probation, (:'JC'I1 fnr 
-4-
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misdemeanors (HRS, § 711-77). Oklahoma permits probation 
to extend up to two years (OSA 22 § 99lc). 
Some states have different probation period 
limitations depending on l·:hether tl:e defendant vras con-
victcd of a felony or a misdemeanor. Kansc.s specifies 
five years for felonies and two years for misdemeanors. 
Furthermore, felony probation may be later extended five 
additional y~ars and misdeDeanor probation two. The 
statute, howe~cr, goes on to provide that, in any case, 
felony probation can not be extended p~st the sentence 
lir1it (;:Si\ 21-4611). Obviously the same is not true for 
r.1isJeoceanors. In L:u~sas a nisder.eanant may receive only 
car' .. inc:trccration (YS.'\ 21-4502). There!'ore, i" 
J, is·.·. 
u .. 
Kansas. i\ 1 .i.su~__, 
up to t~o:o years 
ilnant r:.:Jy be placed on p:-ob,, tion fer ur-
o yeilrs original and two years extension) 
·.;ircum se:nt·:nce limit. 
cilnant way be plac~d on probation for 
(IC 19-2601(7)) although the maximum 
sentence is six mont inprisonment (IC 18-113). California 
goc·s e:v.:_n further. 1:1 tl1.:1t state .:. misdemeanant 1-:ho could 
only Le: incarce:ratc~ .or 90 days ~ay be placed on proba-
tion for .:!:> lone; a;: thrc'e J'L'ars (CAlifornia Pen<.il Code, 
S l203CJ.) and PL·op_ly v. llec,l!l, 72 Cill. Rptr. 457 (1968)). 
-.)-
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Oregon has an interesting statute. In that 
state, a defendant may not be placed on probation for 
less than a year (ORS 137.010). Obviously the Oregon 
legislature feels that probation for less than a year 
is ineffective. 
1 Of all the western states only Arizona, New 
Mexico and Washington restrict probation by the maYinum 
length of sentence (ARS 13-1657, NMSA 40A-29-l9 and 
RCvl 9 • 9 5 • 2 0 0 ) • 
Federal statutes (18 USC § 3651) provide for an 
extended probation period and have been supporteu by 
the United States Supreme Court in a line of cases, 
primary of which is Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 
H 7 , 2 3 L . Ed . 1 -' I 6 2 , 8 9 S . C t . 1 5 0 3 (l 9 6 9 ) . In Fran!:, 
~lr. Ju:;t=icc :I 11 ~ll s~i~, for the Court: 
1 
-: ::tl2_c.·.' ~_,is~ i; i ·_,_:r r-_ 
l' , ;__·c: l.mposed for otherv;i_c;e 
petty offenses. For exanl;Jle, under 
federal law, most offenders may be 
placed on probation for up to five 
years in lieu of or, in certain 
cases, in addition to a term of 
imprisonment. 
* * * 
Therefore, the ~aximun penalty 
authorized in petty offense cases 
Includes Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, C~ljfo•ni~, 
IdahC:, ~tah, llevada, Arizona, 1·1ontana, \"lyoming, Colori1ch•, 
NeVI hexlco, Kansas and Oklahoma. 
-6-
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is not simply six months imprison-
ment and a $500.00 fine. A petty 
offender may be placed on probation 
for up to five years and if the 
terms of probation are violated, he 
nay then be imprisoned for six 
months." 
Finally the American Bar Association has set 
forth s~ilar guidelines in its Standards for Criminal 
Justice. The American Bar Association suggests two 
years probation for a misdemeanor and up to five for a 
felony (Standards, p. 21 Probation). ?he committee adds 
thee 0!, i 1: 101. t:--:a t the limits on the length of a sentence 
to pr· .L_, ·_ ~--: -,;·,ould be determined independently of the 
appro;-r Ll t· lc _:;th of a prison sentence for the same 
offense (Standards, p. 26). 
Th~re are many good policy reasons for allowing 
a trial judge the discretion to extend probation for a 
.cc~::: ..~;:~:::__!__e lc_.~~-(Jch of t i_r.c.: even if it r.LlY be for lonser tha.n 
In his Memorandum Decision 
Judge Crof._ c; the lol.·_r ,-,,urt listed two strong reasons 
in support c~ probati< e:.' ens ion. First under Utah law 
some jail ~cntences ca.· .ot exceed 90 days, as for a Class 
C misderc.e:1nor (Section 76-3-204 (3)). A probationary 
perl suc:1 1~. 1 ted duration hardly serves ar:y L'Seful 
pur:L~~- ~s Ju .0c Cro{t pointed out: 
-7-
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"It is misdemeanor type offenses 
where probation is usually indicatcC 
rather than a jail sentence, but if 
the supervision of such a wrongdoer 1s 
to be limited to the maxinum jail 
sentence that can be served, proba-
tion in such cases becomes only a 
gesture. (R-76) 
Judge Croft goes on to say: 
. the court, when given tLe 
alternative of a short jail sentence 
or a short and thus useless probation 
period, may well start imposing jail 
sentences in those cases where proper 
probationsupervision, if available, 
may well steer a defendant away from 
further criminal activity." (Id.) 
Judge Croft points out a second good reason for an 
extended proLation period: 
"The second reason why I do not 
believe the law should or does re-
quire the limitation of a probation 
period as contended by defendant 
is ~hat, as in the case at bar, 
c::C: c c ~ ->_ _ _ ln most cases, through 
::- _iar,.::, end U_? pl,~:vlil~ .l 
__ ·eluded of fens'-', 
tr2~Je~ •Y doing so in the belief 
that a ~lea to the lesser offense 
may mor li~ely result in consideration 
for prot ,tj tJn. If courts are to [,e 
limited to :1 brief probation period, 
courts re then placed in the position 
of eith•r denying the plea to a lcss0r 
included offense, or using jail 
sentences as the only reasonable s0n-
tence remaining open to the court. 
(R-76) 
Probation is an attempt to give first offc·nC.:erc. 
and some otl:ers a char.ce to demonstrate their ceq~.:.· it·, to 
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overco~e their errors. Another reason for an extension 
of this prcgrilln ~ay Le demonstrated by a hypothetical case. 
The accused is convicted and sentenced to probation and 
papent of a fine as provided by Utah Code Annotated 
§ 77-35-17 (1953, as amended). Suppose the crime was 
a misdemeanor with a penalty of six months in jail. 
Further suppose the convicted man was unable to pay the 
fine within the six months. Under the law, as appellant 
1-:ould have it, the man 1-:ould have to be thrown in jail. 
The ~.0rc h•_L'":'a;~e viev; 1:ould be to allol-l the trial judge 
the .: , 
ur:cl ~ 1 • L- ·' 
~o extend probation be;ond the six months 
:1 some additional time to make good his 
ckb:. 
Respondent strongly ;,~rges this court to af::i:l11 
the decision of the lo·.-.·er court. Appellant •,:ould seek 
special need for disc :ion. A judge, viel-ling the defendant 
f~ce to fau., ;,earinc_ u ·~ 1ssion from both sides concerning 
the defendct: .. , and rc cv g reports from adult probation 
and parole 1s in a mu b· 'ter pc-sition to evaluate the 
nee:ds of an 1:-.dividual than is the legislature. The 
legislature realized all this and thus specifically and 
unccjJivicall:,· endm-:ec '--'1c trial courtv:ith broad discrei~ion 
v:luch rc.:c.,~or;~, nt asks t!ns court to sustain. 
-9-
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Appellant alleges that there is ample authority 
for his position that probation should be limited by 
statutory sentencing provisions. Respondent ansvers that 
most of appellant's proffered authority is misapplied 
and inapplicable to the instant question. The rcDainder 
simply demonstrates the rainority vie1·1. 
Appellant said the general rule is stated in 
21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law, § 555 (p.4 of Appellant's 
brief). 
"Where the suspension of imposition 
of sentence is authorized, the court 
... may, after such suspension, pro-
nounce sentence at any time provided 
the maximwu period for which sentence 
could have been imposed or probation 
9ranted has not elapsed." 
A close reading of the rule, however, and of the case 
cited as suppor"::ing th' rule demonstrate that ". 
maxinum per- _·,· 
which the court must ~ron0unce sentence. It has absolutely 
nothing to do Hith th• SE:I,tence actually imposcc1 or 
maxi..rnwu possible sentc·nce:. In other Vlords, the rule 
simply states that a court can't 11ait forever to ir-poo;c> 
some kind of sentence, Vlhether it is ir.lprisonmcnt or 
probation. The rule has nothing to do Hith hov long 
probation may continue if it is imposed. 
-10-
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On page six of his brief appellant cites 
In re Carroll, a Kansas case, as authority for his 
position. Respondent has already shown that Kansas law 
allOI·IS probation to continue for up to four times the 
maximwn incarceration period in the case of a_misdemeanor. 
If Carroll were still good law there would be a con-
tradiction. Carroll, however, is a 1914 case and has 
long sine~ been overturned by legislative action. In 
!lp~lication of Young, 201 Kan. 140, 439 P.2d 142 (1968), 
the Suprel'le Court of Kansas explains: 
"The parole authority of a police 
court was considered in Carroll. 
The statute then in effect (Laws 
of 1909, Chap. 116, Sec. 2) Has 
, ~amined and since it provided no 
:.it on the ten'< of a parole granted 
reunder, this court held that a 
.ice court had no power to grant a 
, 0le for a term longer than the 
. ·:encc imposed. . The statute 
' c! C ' '-' _ ,_:: C __ ' : l ,C ~ _· .' : i E i-:' J ll ',' 
.. _ 10r lL:c:J to gruncc a parole for a 
t~rm extending beyond the sentence. 
* * * 
The laDguage of K.S.A. 20-2312 
is plain and una~biguous. The 
statute supercedes any case law 
pcrtaininy to the subject. (43P P.2d 
at 143, 145) 
Appellant relies heavily on Idaho cases in 
hi~ argurncllt, particular StCJte v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 
8'.-3, 4'>2 P.:2d 3~0 (l'JC9), and Ex Parte 11edley, 73 Idaho 
-11-
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474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953). Respondent contends that 
neither case applies here. In Idaho, although probation 
can be four times longer than imprisonment for a mis-
demeanor, the rule is different for felonies where pro-
bation is limited by the maximum period of incarceration. 
Both the Sandoval and Medley decisions involve felony 
convictions and not a misdemeanor conviction as in the 
instant case. Obviously therefore, neither case is 
authority for appellant's position. 
Appellant further cites the Oklahoma case of 
Ex Parte Eaton, 29 Okla. Crirn. 275, 233 P.781 (1925). 
Suffice it to say that the pertinant Oklahoma statute 
has bee:n revised. Subsequent to 1970 the lav.' in Oklahoma 
is that a proL;ltion period may be for as long as t\·IO 
years (OS!\ 22 '19lc (197C ) . 
170 Ca.2d 596, 339 P.2d 
20.2 (1959), a 
appellant as authority. That case simply states that if 
no probation period is specified by the judge, the maximum 
prison term becomes the period of probation. It does not 
stand for the proposition, as implied by appellant, that 
probation could not be longer- In fact, the California 
courts have upheld a three year probation period in a 
case where the maximum sentence Has 90 days. (Pconlc v. 
Heath, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457, 266 C.A.2d 754 (1968)). 
-12-
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The only other authority cited by appellant is 
Stnte v. Lard, 86 N.M. 71, 519 P.2d 307 (1974). Respondent 
adr'lits that in New 11exico a convicted person may not be 
placed on probation for a longer period than he may be 
i::1prisoned. However, respondent points out that New 
nexico along with Arizona and l·lashington are the only 
three (out of fourteen) western states that so hold. 
Respondent submits that Utah should maintain its position 
among those states that ~spouse the majority view. 
Appellant is correct, in his report of the 
case L•·.: r.r. tr.e: subject, that when the trial court 
fails tc S2Lc_f; the period of probation it is generally 
held to be the same as the r.aximum sentence period. This 
is not a case, ho~ever, of an unspecified probation pe~1od. 
The trial court very specifically sentenced appellant to 
' > ' • :~ - __.!._') :_ • 
accepted that sentenc 
IClHn II 
;:' l1TlVl Ll '.''Jl ··uRE DID NOT INTEND THAT PRO-
B!,TION BE Lii:ITED BY : .~:l'I' :.CE PROVISIOI<S. 
In his second aryument appellant goes to great 
and imaginative lengths in attemptins to prove that the 
Utah legislature, although not specifically so stating, 
meant for probation periods to be limited by the incarcer-
ation provisions of the Code. Respondent submits that a 
-13-
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simple reading of the statute is more than sufficient 
to convey the legislative intent. As shown, supra, 
the Utah legislature very clearly, and with great 
supporting intent, meant for trial judges to have 
wide discretion in probation matters. In interpretir.g 
statutes the court should assume that each word of a 
statute was used advisedly and should be given epplica-
tion in accord with their usually accepted meaning 
(Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 
P.2d 1035 (1971). Respondent submits that the following 
words are very clear: 
"Upon a plea of guilty or con-
viction. the Court having juris-
diction. may place the defendant 
on probation for such period of ti~e 
as the c::mrt shall determine." (Utah 
C::JdE l'.n:-.otated § 77 35-17 {1953)) 
':J,::>:~c:~_c: added) 
penalty and not a prj·;ilege. This is exJctly L.,c•.·,.J.c,i..; 
of the truth. \Vhen a ctan commits a crime and is adjud'!cc2 
to be guilty he can l:" .. S< Jttenced to serve a time in 
jail or prison. That would be the penalty for his actions. 
Thereafter, as a privilege, granted for v1hatever hur1ar:e 
reasons, the court may allov1 that man to be placed on 
probation in lieu of incarceration. Furtber~orc, rc~pJndcnt 
asks this court to take judicial notice that any rc.>'cc•r.1 l 1 ,. 
-14-
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man would prefer as much as three years probation to 
one year in prison confinement. Obviously appellant 
feels this ~ay since he choose, voluntarily and of his 
o~n accord, one year's probation rather than six months 
in jail. 
Finally, appellant argues that a defendant 
has certain rights while on probation. Respondent 
stipula~cs as nuch. ~owever, all of the "forward looking 
due process concepts" under Norrisey v. Brewer and all 
other cases cited by appellant, have absolutely nothing 
to do with the length of probation. ~his is not a case 
where th~ issue is a revocation hearing, notice, speedy 
lt ~al, '·Titter: findings, or any of the other Horrisey 
,' lJ' Jlt- 1,c Utah legislature r,ay make the lav ,;:'. 
tl tOn and they have wisely chosen to grant 
=retion to solve that problem. 
o;.Lnce U1ere is specific statutory authority 
supt.Jorting the decision of the lo•.:er court, and since 
Utal•'s statutes arc very similar to those of most other 
stc>Les, respondent urges this court to affirm the decision 
of the lowLr court. Such affirrnc:tion \Wuld carry out the 
intent of the legislature of Utah. 
Rcsrectfully submitted, 
VI~ m;m; B. RO!'h'JEY 
Attorney General 
I'IILLT!\;1 \·i. BARHETT 
As:~i::L1nt ,\ttorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
_ 1 r _ c 
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